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Abstract 
Cognitive biases lead entrepreneurs to overinvest in their own companies, over exposing 
themselves to idiosyncratic risk. Our novel theoretical model explains entrepreneurial under-
diversification by measuring the amount of potential bias in entrepreneurs’ portfolio 
allocations brought about by overconfidence and over optimism. Simulation analyses based 
on our model allow us calculating the implicit levels of overconfidence and over optimism 
from observable portfolio choices. Finally, using a unique dataset including cross-regional 
data on Italian entrepreneurs and a structural equation modeling approach, we test the effect 
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1. Introduction 
Several empirical findings show that entrepreneurs often invest a large share of their personal 
wealth in their own companies, over exposing themselves to idiosyncratic risk because their 
stake in the company is higher than the one that a rational risk-return analysis would suggest 
(Heaton and Lucas, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). As Müller (2011, p. 
545) notes: 
Owners of private companies typically have a high share of their personal net worth 
invested in a single private company. The large investments give them high ownership 
shares, which reduces agency costs, but also exposes them to the idiosyncratic risk of 
the company. 
This exposure to idiosyncratic risk can be very costly (Kerins et al., 2004; Pattitoni et al., 
2013). Since some studies point out that entrepreneurs demand compensation for their 
exposure to idiosyncratic risk (Müller, 2011), one possible explanation for this puzzling 
evidence – i.e., that entrepreneurs ‘do not understand’ idiosyncratic risk – can be ruled out.1 
Other justifications mostly rely on non-pecuniary benefits such as achieving greater control 
over their work environment: entrepreneurs obtain substantial rewards from being their own 
boss and, thus, they are willing to accept a suboptimal risk-return trade-off (Puri and 
Robinson, 2008; Ødegaard, 2009; Puri and Robinson, 2009; Shefrin, 2011). An alternative 
explanation is that entrepreneurs may invest in what they think they know better (Vardas and 
Xepapadeas 2012). Despite these justifications, it is still debated why entrepreneurs 
overinvest in their own company given the suboptimal risk-return trade-off. As Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002, p. 774) point out: 
                                                 
1 For a study that analyses the role of bounded rationality in investment decisions, see Magni (2009). 
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[…] it seems surprising that entrepreneurs are willing to invest so heavily in a single 
private firm which offers a far worse risk-return trade-off. 
While the behavioral approach has been extensively used in the field of corporate finance 
(e.g., managerial overconfidence), or with regard to individual or professional investors 
(Glaser and Weber, 2007; Broihanne et al., 2014), there are still few theoretical studies in the 
behavioral economics literature with specific reference to the entrepreneurship field 
(Yazdipour, 2011). We intend to fill this gap, proposing a theoretical framework that proves 
how cognitive biases may explain the decision to become entrepreneur or to continue 
overinvesting in their already existing companies.  
We focus on overconfidence and over optimism as two of the most prominent examples of 
cognitive biases. While overconfidence generally leads entrepreneurs to underestimate the 
risk on the investment in their own companies, over optimism typically causes them to 
overvalue its return. Thus, it is likely that both behavioral biases would lead entrepreneurs to 
overinvest in their companies (Shefrin, 2011).  
With regard to risk underestimation caused by overconfidence, we refer to Slovic’s and 
Olsen’s notion of perceived risk (Slovic, 1987, 2000; Olsen, 2011) and to the ‘two-
component’ total perceived risk formula proposed by Yazdipour (2011).2 We include their 
framework within a theoretical model that distinguishes between the objective component of 
entrepreneurs’ own companies expected returns and the over optimistic component that leads 
to overestimate these returns. It is worth noting that with over optimism, we refer to 
unrealistic optimism as a domain-specific bias in expectations (Weinstein 1980), rather than 
to dispositional optimism, i.e., the positive personality trait by which a person holds positive 
generalized expectations regarding the future (Scheier and Carver, 1985).  
                                                 
2 Yazdipour (2011) distinguishes between the objective (‘resident risk’) and subjective (‘behavioral’) 
components of risk 
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We consider both overconfidence and over optimism as parameters in our model, and show 
how they may affect a risk-return analyses à la Markowitz (Markowitz, 1952, 1959). 
Through this parameterization, we measure the potential bias in entrepreneurs’ portfolio 
allocations brought about by overconfidence and/or over optimism, thus explaining 
entrepreneurial under-diversification. Indeed, under-diversification is an important and well-
known issue for entrepreneurs and investors, which has both micro- and macro-level 
implications (James et al., 2012). Using a simulation analysis, we calculate how distinct 
parameters of overconfidence and over optimism affect entrepreneurs’ portfolio choices. Our 
simulations also allow calculating the overconfidence and over optimism levels that, given a 
set of assumptions on the model parameters, are implicit in observable portfolio choices. 
Then, using a unique dataset including cross-regional data on entrepreneurs in Italy – an ideal 
setting for our analysis given its “entrepreneurial vocation” – and a structural equation 
modeling approach, we test our theoretical predictions on cognitive biases and entrepreneur 
investments. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes our theoretical model and simulation 
analysis. Section 3 presents our empirical analysis and interprets the main findings. Section 4 
provides some policy suggestions and concluding remarks.  
2. Theoretical setup 
In this section we propose our theoretical model, which aims at explaining how cognitive 
biases, and more specifically overconfidence and over optimism, may lead entrepreneurs to 
overinvest in their own companies. In particular, we consider an entrepreneur that has to 
choose her portfolio allocation, i.e., which part of her wealth to invest in her own company 
and which to invest in the stock market. This portfolio optimization problem is dual: either 
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the entrepreneur minimizes the risk for a given portfolio expected return, or she maximizes 
the return for a given portfolio risk (Ingersoll, 1987). In the following section, we discuss the 
impact of overconfidence on risk minimization, as the literature suggests that the former is 
likely to bias risk perceptions (Simon et al., 2000). Then, we focus on the impact of over 
optimism on return maximization, given the relationship between over optimism and 
perceived expected returns (De Meza and Southey, 1996). 
2.1 Overconfidence 
2.1.1 Risk minimization 
Consider an entrepreneur who holds a portfolio composed of two risky assets with weights 
 ', MI ω  and a risk free asset with weight F . Asset I is the entrepreneur investment in 
her own company, while asset M is the entrepreneur investment in a well-diversified stock 
market portfolio. 
The excess return of the entrepreneur’s portfolio can be expressed by μω'P , where 
 ', MI μ  is the vector of the excess returns over the risk free rate Fr . The portfolio 
variance is given by Σωω'2 P , where 






2
2
MIM
IMI


Σ  represents the positive-definite 
variance-covariance matrix of the returns of risky assets with 0det 222  IMMI Σ .  
For a given value of portfolio expected excess return, kP  , the entrepreneur prefers the 
portfolio with the lowest variance. She faces the problem  
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


 kμω
Σωω
'
'min
 (1) 
Note that the constraint 1 FMI   is implicit in kμω' . 
Setting up the Lagrangian and solving the problem (Pattitoni and Savioli, 2011), the optimal 
portfolio weights are 
 
μΣμ
μΣ
ω
1
1
' 


k
k  (2) 
The first element of  kω  represents the weight in the private company, namely  
 
 
2222
2
2222
2
2
2
MIMIMIIMIM
M
MIMIMIIMIM
MMIIMIM
I
k
k
kω









 (3) 
where  MIIMIM    and   is the Jensen’s alpha, i.e.   MMIIMI   . 
2.1.2 Overconfidence-driven under-diversification 
Now we analyze how overconfidence may influence the entrepreneur’s weight in her own 
company. As noted above, overconfidence causes the entrepreneur to undervalue the actual 
risk of the investment in her own company. In this case, the biased standard deviation of the 
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company returns, indicated by I
~ ,3 is lower than the actual standard deviation, i.e., II  
~
.4 We model I
~  as 
   1,01~  CCII   (4) 
where C  is the overconfidence parameter, ranging from 0 (no overconfidence) to 1 
(maximum overconfidence).5 When C  tends to 1, then I
~  tends to zero. To analyze the 
impact on the portfolio weight in the private company caused by overconfidence, we define 
 kωI
~  as  kωI  in Equation (3) with I
~  in place of I , i.e., with biased standard deviation 
instead of the rational one, to take into account that overconfident entrepreneurs tend to 
underestimate the risk of their companies.  
We then consider two cases: first, the private company and market portfolio returns are 
uncorrelated; second, they are correlated either negatively or positively. 
Case 1: Uncorrelated returns ( 0IM ) 
Assuming a null correlation between the private company and market portfolio returns is 
similar to assuming that the private company’s economic situation is (mostly) not affected by 
the economic contingency (Pattitoni et al., 2013). While not fully realistic, this assumption 
might be plausible for new ventures operating in innovative industries and has the advantage 
of greatly simplifying analytical derivations. The main result when the private company and 
market returns are uncorrelated is that the overconfident entrepreneur tends to overinvest in 
                                                 
3 From now on, the tilde over a symbol (e.g., 
I
σ~ ) indicates a biased parameter or variable. 
4 Since the covariance between the private company returns and the market returns is given by
MIIMIM
σσρσ  , if 
the perceived standard deviation of the company returns, 
I
σ~ , differs from the actual one, 
I
σ , then 
overconfidence leads to a biased perception of the covariance, 
IM
σ~ . 
5 Choosing  1,δ
C
 , we would allow for underconfidence. 
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her own company and to be under-diversified, 0)(~  CI k  . The overconfidence bias is 
thus positive and equal to 
    0~  kkb IIc   (5) 
Case 2: Correlated returns ( 0IM ) 
Consider now the case when the private company and market returns are correlated. Using 
the definition of  kI
~ , we get the partial derivative 
       
    222222
22222
112
112~
MCIMIMCIIMIM
MCIIMIMIMMIMCIMMI
C
I kkω


 



  (6) 
Looking at Equation (6), we can conveniently divide our analysis in two subcases. 
Case 2.1 Negatively correlated returns ( 0IM ) 
When the private company and market portfolio returns are negatively correlated (e.g., the 
private company operates in a countercyclical industry), then it is easy to show that 
0)(~  CI k  . Therefore, the result in Equation (5) continues to hold, i.e., the entrepreneur 
underestimates the risk of her own company and overinvest in it.  
Case 2.2 Positively correlated returns ( 0IM ) 
When the private company and market portfolio returns are positively correlated (i.e., the 
private company operates in a cyclical industry), the sign of CI k   )(
~  is not 
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straightforward. Imposing the condition 0)(~  CI k  , we find two stationary points. In 
the space  IC 
~, , the coordinates of these two points are 
   
 
   
 

























22
2
2
22
2
2
112
,111~,
112
,111~,
IMIM
IM
I
IM
I
I
IC
IMIM
IM
I
IM
I
I
IC
k
k














 (7) 
Since   IC  ~,  is a minimum and   IC  ~,  is a maximum, 0)(~  CI k   in the interval 
  CC  , , and 0)(~  CI k   elsewhere.  
We notice that 0  is a sufficient condition for 0C  to hold.
6 However, we assume 
 1,0C . Thus, I
~  reaches its minimum when 0C  and II  
~ .  
On the other hand, when overconfidence approaches its limiting value (i.e., 1C ), we find 
a particular weight 
 
I
I
k
k
C 




~lim
1
 (8) 
When  1, CC  , 0)(~  CI k  . In this case, the entrepreneur invests so much in her own 
company that, to meet the constraints of the portfolio selection problem, the weight in the 
                                                 
6 0α  is a prerequisite to justify investments in private companies because it can be interpreted as a positive 
Net Present Value (NPV > 0). If financial markets are efficient, then positive NPV investments are feasible only 
for real investment projects (e.g., investing in the entrepreneur’s private company), and not for financial 
investment projects, for which the NPV should be zero. 
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well-diversified market portfolio needs to be negative,7 i.e., she should sell the market 
portfolio short. However, we can consider short selling of the market portfolio as not 
significant from an economic point of view. Thus, excluding this extreme case,8 there is no 
ambiguity on the sign of the derivative, and we may conclude that, in general, overconfidence 
leads to overinvestment in the entrepreneur’s own company and to portfolio under-
diversification. Figure 1 offers a graphical representation of all the aforementioned results. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
To analyze the effect of overconfidence more in depth, a point worth noting is that 
overconfidence implies not only suboptimal portfolio weights but also a biased perception of 
portfolio risk. Since the perceived private company risk decreases with the level of 
overconfidence (i.e., 0~  ICI  ), whenever the perceived portfolio risk increases 
with the perceived private company risk (i.e., 0~~  IP  ) and overconfidence leads to 
overinvest in the company (i.e., 0)(~  CI k  ),
9 then it follows that 
    0~~~)(~~)(~  PIICCIPI kk  . 
                                                 
7 Using the constraint in the problem (1), we get  
MIIM
μμωkω ~~  . Therefore, when overconfidence reaches 
its limiting value and  
II
μkkω ~ , then 0~ 
M
ω . When  
II
μkkω ~ , as happens for  1,δδ
CC
 , then 
0~ 
M
ω . Imposing 0~ 
M
ω means that only corner solutions are possible, where the maximum weight that the 
overconfident entrepreneur may invest in her company is given by  
II
μkkω ~ . Thus, the overconfident 
entrepreneur may even be frustrated by not being able, without short selling the market portfolio, to invest the 
desired amount of wealth in her private company. 
8 In this extreme case,   0~ kω
I
, 0~ 
M
ω , and 0
IM
ρ . Since the portfolio variance is given by the formula
    22222 ~1~~21~
MMMCIIMMICII
σωσδσρωωδσω  , following an increase in 
C
δ , the change in the contribution of 
the covariance term (the second term in the expression) to the portfolio variance is positive and dominates the 
change in the contribution of the variance term (the first term in the expression), which is negative. Thus, the 
higher the overconfidence, the higher the perceived portfolio risk for a given 
I
ω~  and, thus, the lower the 
I
ω~  
chosen by the entrepreneur. Of course, this case is at the opposite of what previous studies have shown, i.e., that 
overconfidence leads to underestimation of risk. We can consider this extreme case as not significant from a 
theoretical point of view. 
9 That is the most common case. Conversely, in case 2.2, when  1,δδ
CC
  (i.e., when the entrepreneur should 
sell the market portfolio short), 0~~ 
IP
σσ  but also 0~ 
CI
δ(k)ω . Therefore, the inequality 
0~~ 
PI
σ(k)ω  still holds. 
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To clarify this result Figure 2 shows the link between the perceived frontier of investments 
(the dashed line) and the weight in the entrepreneur’s own company. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The first plot in Figure 2 shows the shift in the frontier caused by overconfidence, while the 
second one projects this shift in the private company weight. Note that the slope of the curve 
in the second plot is determined by 
PI k 
~)(~  . 
All the aforementioned results describe the effects of under evaluating the actual risk due to 
overconfidence and are summed up in the following observation. 
Observation 1. Typically, overconfidence leads the entrepreneur to overinvest 
in her company, 0)(~  CI k  , and to under-diversify her portfolio. The 
only case in which 0)(~  CI k   occurs is when 0IM  and the level of 
overconfidence is particularly high,  1, CC  . 
From the previous observation, the first testable hypothesis follows. 
H1. The entrepreneur investment in her own company has a positive relation 
with her level of overconfidence. 
2.2 Over optimism 
Since overconfidence affects risk perception, we studied its effect on portfolio risk using a 
risk minimization approach, which keeps the expected return level fixed. In the following, we 
analyze the effect of over optimism on portfolio expected return using a return maximization 
approach, which holds the objective risk constant.  
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Figure 3 shows the duality of the problem showing the tangency conditions that identify 
lower iso-risk (left plot) and upper iso-return (right plot). 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
2.2.1 Return maximization 
The duality of the problem allows considering return maximization as the solution for the 
entrepreneur’s optimization problem for a given value of portfolio risk, 
22 sP  . In such a 
setting, the entrepreneur faces the problem  



 2'
'max
sΣωω
μω
 (9) 
Setting up the Lagrangian and solving the problem, the optimal portfolio weights are10  
 
 2
1
1
1
' μΣμ
μΣ
ω



s
s  (10) 
The weight in the private company is 
 
 
   
   2
1
2222222
2
2
1
2222222
2
2
2
MIMIIMIMIMMI
M
MIMIIMIMIMMI
MIMIM
I
s
s
sω









 
(11) 
                                                 
10 As the problem is quadratic, we also obtain a second solution with weights equal to minus those of Equation 
(10). We discard them since they are dominated (   00  sωα
I
). 
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2.2.2 Over optimism-driven under-diversification 
As we mention above, over optimism causes the entrepreneur to overestimate the actual 
return of the investment in her own company. In this case, the biased expected return, 
indicated by 
I
~ , is larger than the actual expected return, i.e., 
II  
~ . 
We model 
I
~  as  
 1,0
1
~ 

 O
O
I
I 


  (12) 
where O  is the over optimism parameter, which ranges from 0 (no over optimism) to 1 
(maximum over optimism). When O  tends to 1, then I
~  tends to infinity.11 Note that the 
justifications of entrepreneur’s under-diversification based on non-pecuniary benefits as the 
desire for control can be modeled by varying Iμ  as well. In that case, the ‘biased’ Iμ would 
incorporate, after an opportune normalization, the value of non-pecuniary benefits. Thus our 
model can simultaneously take into account the case of under-diversification brought about 
by over optimism and/or non-pecuniary benefits. 
In order to see the variation of the portfolio weight in her own company in case of over 
optimism, we define  sωI
~  as the  sωI  in Equation (11) with I
~  in place of 
I , to 
underline that over optimistic entrepreneurs will overestimate future expected returns from 
their company. Using this definition, we get the partial derivative  
                                                 
11 Choosing  1,δ
O
 , we would allow for under optimism. 
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δ
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(13) 
Since   0~  OI δsω , the over optimist entrepreneur tends to overinvest in her own 
company and to be under-diversified. The over optimism bias is  
    0~  ssb IIo   (14) 
The limit case for over optimism identifies a particular weight  
 
 2
1
222
1
~lim
IMMI
M
I
s
s
O







 
(15) 
Similar to overconfidence, a point worth noting is that over optimism implies not only 
suboptimal portfolio weights but also a biased perception of portfolio return. Since the 
perceived portfolio return increases with the perceived private company return (i.e., 
0~~  IP  ), the perceived private company return increases with the level of over 
optimism (i.e.,   01~ 2  OIOI  ), as well as the weight in the private company 
(i.e.,   0~  OI s  ). Then, it follows that 
       0~~~~~~  PIIOOIpI ss  .  
This result is clearly presented in Figure 4, which shows the link between the perceived 
frontier of investments (dashed) and the weight in the private company.  
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[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
The plot on the right of Figure 4 shows the shift in the frontier caused by over optimism; the 
plot on the left projects this shift on the private company weight. Note that the slope of the 
curve in the plot on the left is determined, as explained above, by   pI s 
~~  .  
All the aforementioned results describe the effects of the overestimation of the actual return 
due to over optimism and can be summarized in the following observation. 
Observation 2. Over optimism always leads to overinvestment in the 
entrepreneur’s own company,   0~  OI sω  , and to portfolio under-
diversification. 
From the previous observation, the second testable hypothesis follows. 
H2. The entrepreneur investment in her own company has a positive relation 
with her level of over optimism. 
2.3 Implicit overconfidence and over optimism levels 
To understand the effects of overconfidence and over optimism on the weight invested by the 
entrepreneur in her company, we consider a couple of numerical examples. Using the 
estimates in tables 2 and 4 of Kerins et al. (2004) who analyzed a sample of IPOs in 
technologically-oriented industries, we choose the following set of parameters: 204.1I , 
162.0M , 195.0IM , 535.0I , and 06.0M . We set 300.0k  and implicitly 
determine 0.566s . 
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Based on this set of parameters, in Table 1, we show 
I
~ , 
M
~ , and 
F
~  by varying the level of 
overconfidence (Panel A) or the level of over optimism (Panel B).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
For moderate levels of overconfidence, an increase in C  leads to an increase in I
~ . Note 
that even low levels of overconfidence cause a severe overinvestment in the private company 
(e.g., when 2.0C , the weight in the private company is about 20% larger than it should be 
if the entrepreneur was not overconfident).12 When the level of overconfidence tends to its 
limiting value (i.e., 1C ), 561.0
~ I  and 0
~ M . When 561.0
~ I  (i.e., when C  is 
about 0.8), 0~ M , implying that the entrepreneur is short selling the market portfolio. 
When selling short is not allowed, 
I
~  is thus equal to 0.561.  
Considering the over optimism bias, we note that, as with the case of overconfidence, for 
particularly high levels of over optimism (e.g., 8.0O  or higher), 0
~ M . Differently 
from what happens in case of overconfidence, an increase in O  always causes an increase in 
I
~ . It is worth underlining that, in this numerical example, overconfidence leads to higher 
overinvestment in the company, compared to over optimism.13  
Since the value of I  in the previous numerical example is particularly high, as Kerins et al. 
(2004) referred to companies going public before and during the Internet bubble, in Table 2 
we present another numerical example using a new set of parameters that we may consider as 
an ‘average case’. 
                                                 
12 This result comes from the comparison between the values assumed by 
I
ω~  when 
C
δ  varies. When 0
C
δ , 
3430~ .ω
I
 . When 20.δ
C
 , 4120~ .ω
I
 . Then, the percentage change is (0.412 – 0.343)/0.343=20.12%. 
13 We can prove this claim calculating the percentage change in 
I
ω~ when 
O
δ varies, and showing that is lower 
than the ones calculated above for 
C
δ . 
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In particular, we choose 40.0I , 20.0M , 20.0IM , 15.0I , 06.0M , 
12.0k , and 0.273s . Even if the latter results quantitatively differ from the ones in Table 
1, we notice that their qualitative pattern does not change using this new set of parameters.  
Note that, if we assume that our model is sufficiently adequate to describe entrepreneurs’ 
portfolio choices under overconfidence and/or over optimism, we can also analyze Tables 1 
and 2 with a “bottom-up” perspective to calculate the ‘implicit’ overconfidence and over 
optimism levels given a set of parameters and an observed 
I
~ . For example, based on Table 
1 – Panel A (i.e., using a risk minimization perspective with 300.0k ), after observing 
480.0~ I , we can conclude that 4.0C . Calculating the implicit overconfidence and over 
optimism levels is useful to determine how these behavioral biases may affect entrepreneurial 
decisions. In other words, not only the presence of these biases, but also their magnitude 
impacts the entrepreneurs’ portfolio weight in their own companies and, consequently, the 
level of idiosyncratic risk they bear due to sub-optimal decisions in portfolio formation. 
3. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we empirically test H1 and H2 using a structural equation modeling (SEM) 
approach. In the following subsections, we describe our unique dataset and variables. Then, 
we present our main results and robustness checks. 
3.1 Sample and data 
We test H1 and H2 using a dataset obtained from the Italian Association of Insurance Firms 
(ANIA, Associazione Nazionale delle Imprese Assicurative, 2010). In 2008-2009, ANIA 
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gathered information on 2,295 Italian Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs, i.e., firms with 
less than 250 employees)14 through a survey administered to entrepreneurs and divided in two 
parts: questionnaires and direct interviews.  
Entrepreneurs were first asked to fill in a questionnaire containing data on the insurance 
coverage and other data related to their firm. Then, they were directly interviewed to gather 
additional (personal) information. Thus, a unique feature of this dataset is that it combines 
entrepreneurs’ personal information and data on their companies. We have data on the 
fraction of entrepreneurs’ total wealth invested in their own company. On average, the 
entrepreneurs in our sample invest almost half of their total wealth in their company. This 
choice may lead them to bear too much idiosyncratic risk that eventually may be transferred 
to their household, and affect their wealth. While questionnaires were meant to gather data on 
the firms, with special regard to insurance decisions and access to credit, the direct interviews 
were intended to gather entrepreneurs’ personal information. The dataset includes 
entrepreneurs’ demographic characteristics, but also data regarding their families, such as the 
household wealth, but also on personal insurance contracts, etcetera. In addition, some 
questions were intentionally thought to detect the entrepreneurs’ behaviors, and eventually to 
spot behavioral biases. Answers to these questions provide information not only on 
overconfidence and over optimism, but also on ambiguity aversion, regret aversion, etcetera.  
After deleting observations with missing values, the total number of observations is 1,613.  
                                                 
14 Firms in our sample are  quite young (average firm age is around 34 years) and small (with revenues generally 
below 10 million euros and with an average number of employees of 31). More information on the dataset can 
be found in ANIA (2010). 
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3.2 Measures 
We present a list of the variables we use in our empirical analysis. While in this section we 
mainly focus on the economic rationale of choosing these variables, in Table A1 in the 
Appendix we provide a detailed description of their construction. 
The dependent variable in our models, ω, measures the share of the entrepreneurs’ own 
wealth invested in her company. The entrepreneur’s wealth is defined as the sum of the 
investments in the company and financial market. 
Based on our theoretical model, we include in our empirical models several variables that 
may exert an influence on ω. These variables indicate whether the company has branches 
abroad, the region and the sector in which the company operates. They are specifically meant 
to proxy for risk-return variables15 (correlations, volatilities, expected returns) that are 
unobservable for private companies, but geographic and sector specific, and that, together 
with overconfidence and over optimism, should influence ω.  
Then, we consider a variable measuring entrepreneurs’ attitude toward risk that we built 
using answers to a specific question asked during the interview with the entrepreneur. The 
question asked entrepreneurs which one of the following four states of the world they would 
prefer: “Very high profits with really high risk of loss”, “Good profits and high risk of loss”, 
“Normal profits with low risk of loss”, and finally “Low profits with no risk of loss”. More 
than half of entrepreneurs (almost 1,200 out of 2,295) preferred the first state of the world, 
i.e., “Normal profit, with low risk of loss”, and more than a third (almost 800 respondents) 
choose the second one, i.e., “Good profit, and high risk of loss”, while only about 10% of 
entrepreneurs admitted to choose the less risky possibility, i.e., “Low profit, no risk of loss”. 
                                                 
15 Similar to other studies (Pattitoni et al., 2013), the implicit assumption here is that Italian firms within the 
same region-industry cluster share similarities in terms of risk-return characteristics. 
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To create our measure of overconfidence we use five variables indicating entrepreneurs’ 
dedication to their work (Schaufeli et al., 2002), height (Graham et al., 2013), gender (Barber 
and Odean, 2001), degree of perseverance (Clark and Friesen, 2009) and the degree to which 
they consider themselves better than average (‘Better Than Average effect’, BTA; Hoelzl and 
Rustichini, 2005). In particular, dedication is measured in terms of number of hours after 
which the entrepreneur states she would rather stop working to do something else, 
perseverance reflects whether she immediately or never gives up in difficult times 
(intermediate responses are admitted), and BTA measures if she perceives her abilities and 
knowledge to be above or below the average with respect to other entrepreneurs.  
To create our measure of over optimism, we use four variables indicating the entrepreneur’s 
perception of the probability of having accidents or causing damages (see Luppi and Parisi, 
2009 and the references therein) both compared to the industry average, whether they save 
funds to deal with emergencies, and their expectations in life (Dawson and Henley, 2012). 
The latter variable measures the so-called “Rose-Colored Glasses” (RCG) effect (Lovallo and 
Kahneman, 2003). In particular, entrepreneurs were asked if they expect more good than bad 
things in life (intermediate responses are admitted). 
In Table 3, we present descriptive statistics revealing that on average entrepreneurs in our 
sample invest almost half of their total wealth in their own company and that the majority of 
the companies have no branches abroad. The most represented regions are Lombardy and 
Emilia Romagna, two of the most productive regions in Italy, both accounting for 16.4% of 
the firms in the sample. On the other hand, the most represented sectors are Manufacturing 
(30.6%) and Trade, Hotels and Restaurants (25.5%).16 Also in this respect, our sample is 
representative of the Italian reality where manufacturing and tourism services are prominent 
                                                 
16 The “Building Construction” sector accounts for less than 10% of the total, while the Mining Industry, 
Transportation, Energy, Water and ICT each account for less than 5%. The remain 25% of firms are from 
different sectors related to other services. 
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among SMEs. Entrepreneurs in our sample are mostly male, tend to be slightly conservative 
about risk, dedicated to their companies, perseverant and perceive themselves to be above 
average with respect to other entrepreneurs. On average, they tend to deem the probability of 
having accidents or causing damages to be lower than their peers. Really few entrepreneurs 
(less than 30% of the total) save funds for emergencies,17 while they have positive 
expectations on life.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
3.3 Results 
Our empirical models aim at estimating the relationship between the entrepreneurs’ own 
wealth invested in their company, overconfidence and over optimism. A crucial feature of our 
empirical models is that, while we can observe ω, both overconfidence and over optimism are 
latent variables. To address the relationship between observable and latent variables, we use a 
SEM approach. A typical SEM framework can be divided into two parts: (i) a structural part, 
which accounts for the relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables (both of 
which can be observable or latent); and (ii) a measurement part, aimed at measuring latent 
variables. Results of SEM analyses are typically represented with path diagram. 
Figure 5 shows standardized coefficients of our path diagram. While in the upper part of the 
figure, we show the structural relationships between ω, latent and control variables, in the 
lower part, we measure overconfidence and over optimism. In the measurement part of the 
model, all loadings on our latent variables, enclosed in ovals, are significant. In the structural 
part, we find evidence in support of H1 as the effect of overconfidence on ω is positive and 
                                                 
17 Insurance contracts may be used as a substitute of emergency funds. However, we have evidence (not 
reported here for reasons of space) that the companies in our sample are dramatically under-insured.  
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highly significant. However, in contrast with H2, over optimism seems not to affect the 
weight in the entrepreneur’s own company. Consistent with findings of our simulation 
analysis, this result suggests the effect of overconfidence on ω dominates the effect of over 
optimism. Furthermore, the estimated covariance between our latent constructs, represented 
by a curved line in the figure, is not significant. As for the control variables, we find 
significant regional and industrial effects (in the figure we report joint tests of significance). 
This is an expected result since, as we mention above, these variables proxy for omitted 
variables that affect entrepreneurs’ choices and that may be common across geographic and 
sector clusters. In addition, we find that entrepreneurs whose firms have no branches abroad 
invest more in their companies. Finally, risk attitude seems to negatively affect ω. Although 
this results may appear counterintuitive, it may be that, similar to a form of “local bias”, 
entrepreneurs perceive their companies as safe investments so that lower risk attitude implies 
high stakes in their companies. 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
To analyze the relationship between entrepreneur investments in their own companies and 
cognitive biases more in depth, Figure 6 shows the geographical representation of the 
regional averages of ω (left plot) and the predictions of overconfidence (central plot) and over 
optimism (right plot) based on the model in Figure 5. Darker colors indicate higher values of 
the corresponding variable. Even though the evidence is not clear cut, spatial clustering, 
maybe reflecting unobserved heterogeneity at regional level seems to characterize our 
variables. This unobserved heterogeneity is possibly brought about by structural risk-return 
characteristics of the firms that are omitted in the model, but controlled for by the inclusion 
of regional and industrial fixed effects.  
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
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In Table 4, we present a few robustness checks (we omitted the measurement part of the 
models for brevity). An initial concern with our empirical analysis is that overconfidence and 
over optimism may be endogenous. Models 2, 3 and 4 take this potential endogeneity into 
account. In Model 2, we add ω to the equations of overconfidence and over optimism 
allowing for simultaneity between the two biases on one side and the share of the 
entrepreneurs’ own wealth invested in her company on the other side. In Model 3, we 
consider a potential bidirectional feedback between overconfidence (which appears in the 
over optimism equation) and over optimism (which appears in the overconfidence equation). 
While in the model underlying Figure 5 (which is reported for reference in the first column of 
Table 4) we estimated the correlation between overconfidence and over optimism, in Model 3 
the relationship between the latter two biases is assumed to be structural. Finally, in Model 4 
we consider both simultaneity and bidirectional feedback between overconfidence and over 
optimism. Results suggest that the role of ω in modeling overconfidence and over optimism 
is negligible. In addition, excluding Model 3, where overconfidence seems to negatively 
influence over optimism, there are no other significant coefficients to report in the 
overconfidence and over optimism equations. On the other hand, after controlling for 
endogeneity and bidirectional feedback, some of the coefficients in the ω equation of Models 
2, 3 and 4 become insignificant, possibly due to inefficiency brought about by the inclusions 
of irrelevant paths (the standard errors of Models 2 and 3 seem to be inflated if compared to 
those of Model 1). In the light of these results, we conclude that endogeneity is unlikely to 
play a major role in our empirical application or at least that its influence is not strong enough 
to invalidate inference based on simpler models. 
A second concern with our analysis is the role of entrepreneur’s height and gender in the 
reflective measurement model of overconfidence. Since height and gender are exogenous 
variables, directly including these two variables among the determinants of ω rather than 
24 
 
using them as reflective indicators may seem more appropriate. Model 5 provides such an 
empirical test. While male entrepreneurs are found to invest more in their own companies, the 
results about the effects of overconfidence and over optimism on ω remain virtually 
unchanged. 
Finally, Models 6, 7 and 8 present some sensitivity analyses excluding industrial fixed effects 
(Model 6), regional fixed effects (Model 7) or both (Model 8). Our results confirm those of 
Model 1, suggesting that the relationship between behavioral biases and ω is robust enough to 
withstand changes in the specification of the model. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4. Conclusions 
Previous findings in the literature show that entrepreneurs tend to overinvest in their own 
company, bearing higher levels of idiosyncratic risk, with respect to what would be optimal. 
We propose a possible explanation for this sub-optimal behavior, based on behavioral biases, 
that complements other explanations, which rely on non-pecuniary benefits, such as the 
entrepreneurs’ desire of control. 
We present a theoretical model that allows showing and measuring how overconfidence and 
over optimism affect the fundamental variables of the risk-return analysis à la Markowitz and 
lead entrepreneurs to overinvest in their own company and hold under-diversified portfolios. 
Overconfidence leads to underestimate the risk associated with the entrepreneur’s own 
company, while over optimism to overestimate its expected return. Our model contributes to 
the literature on risk perception, but it could be extended to consider other motivations for the 
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entrepreneurial behavior, such as the desire for control, since the latter, like over optimism, is 
likely to lead entrepreneurs to overestimate expected return on their own companies. 
We perform simulation analyses to ascertain how much the entrepreneur’s decision for 
investing in her own company is affected by variations in the two behavioral biases. As our 
theoretical model predicts, the entrepreneur invests more in her company as overconfidence 
and over optimism increase. The simulation can also be used, given other parameters and the 
weight in the private company, to calculate the implicit levels of entrepreneurial 
overconfidence and over optimism. Having an idea of the levels of overconfidence and over 
optimism may be useful to institutional investors when they have to choose which 
entrepreneurial projects to finance and for preliminary self-analysis by entrepreneurs. 
Finally, using cross-regional data regarding 2,295 Italian SMEs we directly observe the share 
of entrepreneurs’ total wealth invested in their own companies, and we use information on 
entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics to discern how overconfidence and over optimism 
affect their choice on how much to invest in their companies. Using a SEM approach, our 
empirical results, corroborated by several robustness checks which allow us to increase the 
generalization potential of our analysis, suggest that overconfidence indeed leads 
entrepreneurs to invest more in their own companies, while the effect of over optimism is not 
statistically significant (simulation analyses further suggest that the effect of overconfidence 
dominates the effect of over optimism). Further research could expand these results by 
considering international settings. Although Italy is an ideal context for our empirical 
analysis due to its “entrepreneurial vocation”, research on other countries could check for 
further implications of our theoretical model. These implications could be useful to stimulate 
further debate about the effects of cognitive biases on entrepreneurial choices. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable description 
Variable  
Structural  
ω This variable, which can range from 0 to 1, indicates the share of the entrepreneur’s 
own wealth invested in her company. The entrepreneur’s wealth is defined as the 
sum of the investments in the company and financial market. 
Local This is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a company has no branches abroad. 
Regions This is a set of 20 regional dummies. The two regions Piedmont and Aosta Valley 
are pulled together since the latter is a small region, geographically close to 
Piedmont. 
Industries This is a set of 7 dummies indicating the industry in which the entrepreneur 
operates. 
Risk attitude This is a measure of entrepreneurs’ attitude toward risk. Entrepreneurs were asked if 
they would prefer: (4) “Very high profits and risk”, (3) “Good profits and moderate 
risk”, (2) “Moderate profits and low risk”, or (1) “Low profits and no risk”. The 
variable is normalized to the standard unit interval, with higher values indicating 
greater attitude toward risk. 
Measurement  
Dedication 
(log) 
This is a measure of entrepreneurs’ dedication. It is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of hours after which the entrepreneur states she would 
rather stop working to do something else. 
Height (log) Height is the natural logarithm of the entrepreneur’s height in centimeters.  
Male This is a dummy variable equal to 1 for male entrepreneurs. 
Perseverance This is a measure of entrepreneurs’ perseverance. Entrepreneurs were asked if in 
difficult times, they: (0) “immediately give up” or (10) “never give up”. All 
responses between 0 and 10 were accepted. The variable is normalized to the 
standard unit interval, with higher values indicating greater perseverance. 
BTA This variable measures the “Better Than Average effect”. Entrepreneurs were asked 
if they perceive their abilities and knowledge to be above or below the average with 
respect to other entrepreneurs. The variable is normalized to the standard unit 
interval, with higher values indicating entrepreneurs more confident in their abilities 
and knowledge. 
Accidents This is a measure of the entrepreneur’s perception of the probability of having 
accidents. Higher values indicate that the entrepreneur deems the probability of 
having accidents lower than the average of other entrepreneurs operating in the 
same industry. The variable is normalized to the standard unit interval. 
Damages This is a measure of the entrepreneur’s perception of the probability of causing 
damages. Higher values indicate that the entrepreneur deems the probability of 
causing damages lower than the average of other entrepreneurs operating in the 
same industry. The variable is normalized to the standard unit interval.  
Emergencies 
Funds 
This is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur does not set aside funds to 
deal with emergencies. 
RCG This variable measures the “Rose-Colored Glasses” effect. Entrepreneurs were 
asked if they expect more good things than bad things in life. The variable is 
normalized to the standard unit interval, with higher values indicating greater 
optimism. 
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Table 1. Implicit overconfidence and over optimism levels – parameters from Kerins et 
al. (2004) 
Panel A – Overconfidence effects on risk minimization 
C  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.1  
Iω
~  0.343 0.412 0.480 0.534 0.563 0.561 
Mω
~  1.943 1.328 0.723 0.235 -0.024 0.000 
Fω
~  -1.286 -0.740 -0.203 0.230 0.461 0.439 
P
~  0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
P
~  0.566 0.487 0.387 0.267 0.135 0.000 
Panel B – Over optimism effects on return maximization 
O  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.1  
Iω
~  0.343 0.383 0.421 0.452 0.472 0.479 
Mω
~  1.943 1.544 1.058 0.498 -0.103 -0.694 
Fω
~  -1.286 -0.927 -0.479 0.050 0.630 1.215 
P
~  0.300 0.298 0.289 0.272 0.247 0.215 
P
~  0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566 0.566 
Parameters 
k  s  I  M  I  M  IM  
0.300 0.566 0.535 0.06 1.204 0.162 0.195 
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Table 2. Implicit overconfidence and over optimism levels – our assumptions 
Panel A – Overconfidence effects on risk minimization 
C  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.1  
Iω
~  0.509 0.605 0.696 0.768 0.805 0.800 
Mω
~  0.727 0.488 0.259 0.079 -0.013 0.000 
Fω
~  -0.236 -0.093 0.045 0.153 0.208 0.200 
P
~  0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 0.120 
P
~  0.273 0.234 0.185 0.127 0.064 0.000 
Panel B – Over optimism effects on return maximization 
O  0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.1  
Iω
~  0.509 0.565 0.618 0.660 0.687 0.696 
Mω
~  0.727 0.571 0.383 0.169 -0.057 -0.278 
Fω
~  -0.236 -0.136 0.000 0.170 0.369 0.582 
P
~  0.120 0.119 0.116 0.109 0.100 0.088 
P
~  0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 0.273 
Parameters 
k  s  I  M  I  M  IM  
0.120 0.273 0.150 0.060 0.400 0.200 0.200 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Structural     
ω 0.479 0.340 0 1 
Local 0.944    
Regions: Piedmont and Aosta Valley 0.082    
Lombardy 0.164    
Trentino – South Tyrol 0.001    
Veneto 0.074    
Friuli – Venezia Giulia 0.056    
Liguria 0.043    
Emilia – Romagna 0.164    
Tuscany 0.096    
Umbria 0.030    
Marche 0.032    
Lazio 0.043    
Abruzzo 0.007    
Molise 0.011    
Campania 0.077    
Apulia 0.058    
Basilicata 0.001    
Calabria 0.007    
Sicily 0.030    
Sardinia 0.025    
Industries: Mining 0.027    
Manufacturing 0.306    
Energy, water, telecommunications 0.009    
Building 0.089    
Trade, hotels and restaurants 0.255    
Transportation 0.044    
Other services 0.270    
Risk attitude 0.431 0.232 0 1 
Measurement     
Dedication (log) 2.127 0.354 0 3.178 
Height (log) 5.149 0.048 4.997 5.298 
Male 0.666    
Perseverance 0.789 0.165 0 1 
BTA 0.590 0.207 0 1 
Accidents (higher values, lower probability) 0.898 0.199 0 1 
Damages (higher values, lower probability) 0.903 0.198 0 1 
Emergencies Funds (1 indicates no emergencies funds) 0.725    
RCG 0.725 0.177 0 1 
Source: our elaboration on data provided by ANIA (2010). Number of observations is 1,613. 
 
Table 4. Robustness checks 
 
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of observations 1,613. All models include a constant. Standardized 
coefficients. Robust SEs in parenthesis. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ω equation 
Overconfidence 0.078*** 
(0.030) 
0.045 
(0.104) 
0.078*** 
(0.030) 
0.276 
(0.267) 
0.084** 
(0.041) 
0.080*** 
(0.030) 
0.078** 
(0.031) 
0.079** 
(0.031) 
Over optimism -0.043 
(0.033) 
-0.639 
(0.951) 
-0.043 
(0.033) 
-0.541 
(0.876) 
-0.054 
(0.033) 
-0.045 
(0.034) 
-0.042 
(0.033) 
-0.045 
(0.034) 
Domestic 0.135*** 
(0.025) 
0.157*** 
(0.045) 
0.135*** 
(0.025) 
0.160*** 
(0.042) 
0.138*** 
(0.025) 
0.137*** 
(0.025) 
0.136*** 
(0.025) 
0.140*** 
(0.024) 
Risk attitude -0.045* 
(0.025) 
-0.089 
(0.080) 
-0.045* 
(0.025) 
-0.099 
(0.076) 
-0.048* 
(0.025) 
-0.047* 
(0.025) 
-0.049** 
(0.025) 
-0.050** 
(0.025) 
Height     -0.029 
(0.032) 
   
Male     0.094*** 
(0.031) 
   
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Overconfidence equation 
ω  0.037 
(0.105) 
 -0.202 
(0.437) 
    
Over optimism   -0.009 
(0.039) 
-0.025 
(0.557) 
    
Over optimism equation 
ω  0.629 
(0.938) 
 0.511 
(0.977) 
    
Overconfidence   -0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.114 
(0.513) 
    
Figure 1. Private company weight in case of overconfidence 
 
Figure 2. Frontier shift and overconfidence bias 
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Figure 3. Duality in portfolio optimization 
 
Figure 4. Frontier shift and over optimism bias. 
 
 
Figure 5. Estimated model 
 
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of observations is equal to 1,613. All models include a constant. 
Standardized coefficients. 
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Figure 6. Regional distribution of ω, overconfidence and over optimism 
   
The map shows regional averages. Darker colors indicate higher values. Overconfidence and Over optimism are normalized to the standard unit 
interval. 
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